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In reviewing Professor Louis Henkin's book, Foreign Affairs and the 
Constitution, I am tempted in the manner of those who review books 
for the New York Review of Books to take off on my own. The title of 
the book, the timeliness of the subject, and the clear need for examining 
the "controlling relevance of the Constitution"' to the conduct of for­
eign affairs, invites thought and debate. How can one read the title 
without contemplating the Constitution and the war, for example? 
The longest, most expensive, and most divisive war of American 
history has just been concluded. It was made without Congress exercis­
ing its constitutional right (or perhaps duty) "to declare war," and it 
ended without a peace treaty. In the meantime the Supreme Court has 
managed for ten years to avoid a decision as to what has happened to 
Article I, Section 8 (II) of the Constitution. Professor Henkin states 
that "[t]he President has power ... to wage in full ... war imposed 
upon the United States."2 It tests one's imagination, however, to believe 
that the Vietnam war came about because the President was required 
to act as commander-in-chief to repel a North Vietnamese attack on the 
United States. 
What has happened to the power of Congress to declare war? Surely 
the United Nations Charter with its principle that all members "shall 
settle their international disputes by peaceful means"3 did not amend 
Congress's constitutional power to declare war. Yet administration 
spokesmen have suggested as much. Neither has Undersecretary of 
State Katzenbach's claim4 before the Foreign Relations Committee that 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, combined with the SEATO treaty, to 
become the "functional equivalent" of a declaration of war, displaced 
the constitutional law of the land. 
Professor Henkin does not provide definitive answers to such proposi­
tions. But he does provide the historical and legal background necessary 
*Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University.
1L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION vii (1972).
2/d. at 52 (emphasis added).
3U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para.3.
'113 Co NG. REC. 23390-92 ( 1967) (testimony of Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach),
also in Hearings on S. Res. 151 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 77-188 (1967). 
469 
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
for an examination of the separate powers of the Congress and the
President in the area of foreign affairs.
Foreign relations powers appear "not so much 'separated' as fissured,
along jagged lines," he observes.' Since these fissures have not devel-
oped along clear lines of division, the protagonists have engaged, in
Professor Henkin's apt phraseology, in "tugging for more of the blanket
under claim of constitutional right."'
Can a legal power once lost be retrieved? Can legal concepts such as
precedents, laches, prescription, be woven into a legal doctrine which
will negate specific and clear provisions of the Constitution? This is an
interesting legal question. But when one discusses the relative powers of
the President and the Congress in foreign affairs one is dealing as much
with a political question as with a legal issue.
Whether the "tug of war" between the Congress and the President
involves the war power, the treaty power, or other foreign policy powers,
the point is the same. As long as the contest continues, as it has since
1789, we are on relatively solid constitutional ground. The danger is that
if one of the contending parties were to pull the other into the chasm
and thus achieve complete domination over foreign policy, the nation
as the founding fathers conceived it, and as we know it, would not
survive.
In 1926, the late Professor Lindsay Rogers of Columbia University
in his magnificent book, The American Senate, wrote that control over
foreign policy by one third of the Senate "is a control which .. .
unfortunately, cannot be got rid of by any of the ordinary devices of
popular government."' He was writing in the aftermath of the Senate's
rejection of the League of Nations and the World Court. Fortunately,
Mr. Rogers was either wrong, or extraordinary events-such as World
War II and the development of nuclear weapons-negated the power of
one third of the Senate to control foreign policy.
Today the Senate finds itself forced to express its sense (by a vote of
50 to six) in terms such as these: "Whereas the Constitution states that
the President of the United States must have the advice and consent of
the Senate in order to make treaties. . . . Now therefore, be it
[rlesolved, That any agreement with Portugal or Bahrain for military
bases or foreign assistance should be submitted as a treaty to the Senate
for advice and consent." 8 The President noted the resolution, but did not
5L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 32.
1Id.at 34.
7L. ROGERS, THE AMERICAN SENATE 55 (1931).
IS. Res. 214, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. S3290 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1972).
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submit those executive agreements to the Senate alone, or to the Con-
gress.
The concern today is not that the Senate is too strong in the field of
foreign affairs, but too weak. It is the President who dictates whether
the nation is to be at war or peace. The Foreign Relations Committee
of the Senate has been struggling to reassert some degree of
congressional control over the President, but thus far with markedly
little success. Two efforts by that Committee last year, were approved
by the Senate, but failed in conferences with the House of Representa-
tives because the House took positions in support of power for the
President.
One effort was mounted by Senator Case, Republican senator from
New Jersey. He sought to prohibit the expenditure of funds to carry out
any agreement with a foreign government which provides for establish-
ment of a military base in that country and assignment of American
combat units to that base, unless the Senate first has given its advice
and consent to such agreement. House conferees refused to accept this
language even though Senator Case was willing to broaden it to aban-
don the implication that the language was applicable only to treaties.
He offered to make it clear that the House could be a full party to
approval of any such agreement.'
Another effort to assert legislative power was mounted by Senator
Javits, of New York, also a Republican. Supported by Senators Stennis
of Mississippi, Spong of Virginia, and Eagleton of Missouri, the Javits
bill'0 sought to require congressional authorization before the commit-
ment of United States armed forces in hostilities abroad. An exception
was made for specific cases of emergency when the President might
engage troops in combat for up to 30 days before obtaining
congressional approval. Although the Senate approved the bill 68 to 16,
House conferees were dedicated to a much weaker version of the same
concept." Meeting with Senate conferees for two frustrating sessions the
conferees agreed to disagree, and so, no legislation was forthcoming for
the President to veto.
I subscribe to the pendulum theory to help me understand the foreign
policy tug of war between the President and the Congress. The pendu-
'For discussion see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, in the FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
OF 1972, S. Rep. No. 823, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
'*S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). For debate see 118 CONG. REC. S5255-84 (Daily ed. Mar.
30, 1972).
"See H.R.J. Res. 1, 92d .Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), proposed by Congressman Zablocki, Democrat
from Wisconsin.
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lum swung far toward the Senate in the aftermath of World War I.
During and after World War II, the pendulum swung far toward the
President. That swing continued until the power of the President to
make war in Vietnam encountered increasing public and congressional
opposition. Now in the aftermath of the Vietnam war we may be wit-
nessing the beginning of the swing of the pendulum back toward the
Congress. To paraphrase-crises make poor constitutional law in the
area of foreign affairs. But if crises have kept the pendulum swinging
as between the foreign policy powers of the Congress and the President,
then they have kept the nation from going over the brink to foreign
policy dictatorship on the one hand or to the disorderly management
of foreign policy by legislative bodies on the other.
So long as the pendulum swings, the nation will survive.
I fear the preceding paragraphs have too well illustrated the provoca-
tive nature of Professor Henkin's book inasmuch as the foregoing com-
ments were stimulated by his first 65 pages which deal mainly with the
powers of the President in foreign affairs.
Professor Henkin opens his discussion of the powers of Congress with
these words:
If in the competition for power in foreign relations the Presidential
office has had inherent advantages, Congress has had other, enormous
strengths, not the least the history, the conception, and the generous
grants of the Constitution.
In concise and readable language, Professor Henkin describes those
strengths.
His chapters on Treaties and the Treaty Power, The Courts in For-
eign Affairs, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism, and The Limits of
Constitutional Power, should be required reading for public servants in
the Congressional, the Judicial, and the Executive branches of Govern-
ment, as well as the press. I was about to add the phrase: "if those
individuals are concerned with foreign relations," and thus by implica-
tion I would have implied that an individual concerned with, say, civil
rights would not find much meat in the book. This is not the case.
Henkin relates the powers of the President in the field of foreign affairs
to individual rights in a chapter entitled Individual Rights and Foreign
Affairs.
In that connection and in discussing the powers of the President,
Professor Henkin describes them as being "indeed plenary," even to the
11L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 67.
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extent of making some law in the United States. 3 But then he adds:
"Of course, the President cannot do what is forbidden to him . . . by
the Bill of Rights."' 4
Surely one hopes that to be the case and, I daresay, Professor Henkin
was also only expressing a hope. "The President," says Professor Hen-
kin, "would not make a treaty that forbids teaching or advocating racial
superiority because it would probably violate the First Amendment."' 5
It is a political judgment as to whether a President would make such a
treaty. One need not be too radical to believe that some future President
would make such a treaty, that the courts might find that he
could-despite the Bill of Rights. In that instance the final protection
would not have been abandoned if the Senate failed to give its consent
to such a treaty. Hence the need to preserve the treaty veto power of
the Senate.
Professor Henkin's book is unusually well-documented. Indeed, for
the statistically minded, there are 281 pages of text and 252 pages of
notes and citations-all placed in the back of the book-a benefit for
the general reader, if not a boon to the indepth student. A well done
and complete 16 page index makes the book a valuable reference instru-
ment.
In short, Professor Henkin has given students, scholars, lawyers, pub-
lic servants-indeed, all Americans who care about foreign affairs and
the Constitution-a book which I believe comes close to being a classic,
as defined by Webster, "of recognized value: serving as a standard of
excellence.""
CARL MARCY*
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In the challenging business world of today, management often must
look beyond national boundaries in order to realize the fullest profit
31d. at 64.
14Id.
'
51d. at 254 (emphasis added).
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